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Abstract
Although Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is poised to displace barcodes, security vul-
nerabilities pose serious challenges for global adoption of the RFID technology. Specifically,
RFID tags are prone to basic cloning and counterfeiting security attacks. A successful cloning
of the RFID tags in many commercial applications can lead to many serious problems such
as financial losses, brand damage, safety and health of the public. With many industries such
as pharmaceutical and businesses deploying RFID technology with a variety of products, it is
important to tackle RFID tag cloning problem and improve the resistance of the RFID sys-
tems. To this end, we propose an approach for detecting cloned RFID tags in RFID systems
with high detection accuracy and minimal overhead thus overcoming practical challenges in
existing approaches. The proposed approach is based on consistency of dual hash collisions
and modified count-min sketch vector. We evaluated the proposed approach through exten-
sive experiments and compared it with existing baseline approaches in terms of execution
time and detection accuracy under varying RFID tag cloning ratio. The results of the experi-
ments show that the proposed approach outperforms the baseline approaches in cloned
RFID tag detection accuracy.
Introduction
RFID is an emerging auto-identification technology that uses radio waves to automatically iden-
tify and track physical objects without line of sight [1]. As compared to the conventional bar-
code, RFID tag is reusable, does not require line-of-sight, it is readable or writable and it is less
error prone. As a result, RFID is expected to be a successor to the standard optical barcode and
anticipated to be used in many applications including shipping and port operations [2], supply
chain management [3], water level monitoring [4], anti-counterfeiting pharmaceutical products
[5], banknotes [6] and also the Internet of Things (IoT) [7], [8]. As RFID enables enhanced syn-
chronization of data as well as greater responsiveness to any changes because of real time infor-
mation visibility, RFID can increase operational efficiency and lower operational cost and bring
improved service quality to organizations. For example, the use of RFID technology in the sup-
ply chain management can significantly increase the accuracy as well as the efficiency and reli-
ability of the entire chain by increasing the ability to track and locate products and distribution
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management. Moreover, the capability of RFID to deliver information in real-time can consid-
erably enhances the processes of the supply chain administration and planning.
Despite its enormous advantages, security concerns have become a barrier to the widespread
adoption of the RFID technology. RFID systems are vulnerable to a wide variety of malicious
attacks chief of which is cloning of the genuine RFID tags [1], [9]. For example, the most widely
used RFID standard Class-One Generation-Two tag [10] in critical applications such as ship-
ping and port operations [2], supply chain management [3], pharmaceutical products [5], bank-
notes [6] as well as Internet of Things (IoT) [7], [8] can easily be cloned [11]. As RFID tag
cloning could impose a serious threat to the RFID enabled applications and endanger the safety
and health of individuals particularly in food, medical and pharmaceutical industries, these crit-
ical applications require mechanism against RFID tag cloning attacks. Furthermore, cloning of
RFID tags can lead to brand damage and financial losses. The counterfeit drug market is worth
of USD $40 billion per year seriously affecting the global pharmaceutical industry [12]. With
RFID tags attached to drug packaging, the industry expects to substantially decrease the loss
due to counterfeit drug market [12]. Without the implementation of efficient RFID tag cloning
detection, the efforts to combat counterfeit pharmaceuticals will not bare fruit.
Even though RFID authentication methods that are based on cryptography and encryption
are able to prevent tag cloning as well assuring privacy and security [13], these methods cannot
be implemented on the low cost tags due to the resource constraint such as limited memory
and computational power of the RFID tag [14]. Moreover, there is a number of well docu-
mented examples of RFID tag cloning including human implantable VeriChip tag used by
Mexican government to protect access to a secure records room [15] and also Texas Instru-
ments RFID Digital Signal Transponder (TI-DST) tag used in ExxonMobil SpeedPass systems
to authenticate customers purchase gasoline [16]. TI-DST tag data is able to be captured in a
short time for cracking its encryption key and this is an example that tag based security is not
the ultimate solution to tag cloning. Therefore, a light weight anti-cloning approach is required
to support the RFID tag clone detection.
There are several approaches for low cost counterfeit tag detection that are based on
the appearance of the tags having identical unique identification (EPC) plus other related
information in the system [9]–[11], [17]–[20]. However, as duplicate readings of RFID
tags are common [3], [21], detection of counterfeit tag based on EPC alone cannot verify
counterfeit tags from genuine tags. Advanced methods such as those that write random
numbers on the tags [17], [18], [22] require redundant operations to check whether the
current random number in the tag is correct and to replace it with a new random number
each time the tag is read. In fact, when detection is triggered for the same EPC as in [17]
and [18], manual verification is required on the objects that the tags are attached to. Cer-
tainly these approaches incur excessive overhead, large delays between the scans and slow-
down the reading rate of the tags.
A recent study [20] proposed an approach using information in the e-pedigree to detect
counterfeiting. However, relying on the entire certified record of the e-pedigree would not defi-
nitely verify the perfect detection of counterfeit tags. This is due to the probability of the com-
plete e-pedigree inaccessibility in RFID-enabled supply chain [20], [23], [24]. According to [20]
and [24], e-pedigree creation and management is crucial yet challenging task as its implementa-
tion involves a number of practical issues including implausibility or incompleteness. It was
found that the genuine tagged products are repeatedly read with a high rate about 50.425% than
the counterfeit tags [17], [18]. This is because the genuine tagged product is checked at least
once at every stage of the supply chain and the counterfeit tag injected to the supply chain only
after getting copied the genuine tag’s EPC which makes the scans delay.
Clone RFID tag detection
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In this paper, we propose a counterfeit RFID tag detection approach that is based on consis-
tency of dual hash collisions and modified count-min sketch vector. The count-min sketch
vector is a data structure in which we used dual independent hash functions to map the
streaming tag reading data onto the sketch vector. We propose a dual verification strategy that
combines consistent dual hash collisions with tag reading frequency aggregated over time
intervals to verify which of the suspicious tags is genuine and which is counterfeit. Extensive
performance analysis of the proposed approach is carried out and its performance is compared
with baseline approaches [25]. The results of the experiments show that the proposed approach
outperforms the baseline approaches as much as 99% in the detection accuracy with a reduced
communication overhead under varying RFID tag cloning ratio. The contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows:
• Analysis of the state-of-the-art approaches for low cost counterfeit tag detection;
• We propose a novel counterfeit RFID tag detection approach that is based on consistency of
dual hash collisions and modified count-min sketch vector.
• Extensive performance analysis of the proposed approach is carried out and compared with
BASE and DeClone, the approaches proposed in [25].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section Background presents the background
information and related works while Section Clone Tag Detection Algorithm describes in detail
the proposed counterfeit tag detection approach. Performance analysis of the proposed
approach is presented in Section Performance Evaluation. Conclusion and future work are pre-
sented in Section Conclusion and Future Directions.
Background
A. System model
A global standard RFID data sharing infrastructure, EPCglobal network [26] is an important
part of the Internet of Things (IoT). EPCglobal is made up of Electronic Product Code (EPC),
EPC Information Services (EPCIS), and EPC Discovery Services (EPCDS) amongst others.
Each physical product in the EPCglobal network is associated with an RFID tag, represented by
a unique EPC. This EPC can be retrieved from the RFID tags wirelessly via RFID readers with-
out line of sight. These read events are usually processed by a middleware [27], and are stored
locally at each supply chain partner’s location-centric EPCIS. In order to process RFID data effi-
ciently, middleware functionality should not be restricted to a centralized data center but rather
distributed with the right level of logic placed at the right location or tier in the middleware
architecture [28]. Therefore, the proposed approach (MCH) in this study is suitable to be imple-
mented in the RFID middleware either at the operational or enterprise tier of middleware archi-
tecture for each supply chain partners (Fig 1). MCH will first do monitoring at operational tier
(i.e., at individual sites like warehouse or distribution center or retail store). Overall, MCH will
continually monitor EPC numbers throughout supply chain and instantly highlight any EPC
numbers that are suspicious and verifying which of the tags is clone and which is genuine one.
In this paper, we consider a distributed RFID-enabled supply chain management system as
shown in Fig 2. The architecture generally consists of a backend server, RFID readers and a
number of low cost passive RFID tags attached to the products. The RFID readers are intercon-
nected with the local server via secure wired or wireless channel and communicate with the tags
via wireless channel. RFID readers are placed at different locations such as at manufacturing,
shipping, distribution center, retailer and checkout counters to record the product flow in dis-
tributed RFID supply chain.
Clone RFID tag detection
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Each RFID tag has a unique EPC and receives power during interrogation by a reader. An
RFID reader can be any devices that capable of querying object identity stored in the RFID tag
Fig 1. Multitier middleware architecture ([28]).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193951.g001
Fig 2. Distributed RFID supply chain system.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193951.g002
Clone RFID tag detection
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which include a PDA and a mobile phone [29], [30]. A tag interrogation by the readers is
recorded in the local EPC Information Services (EPCIS). The e-pedigree data is captured via
these EPCIS events and securely shared with trading partners when required [31]. For exam-
ple, an RFID event could be as (EPC_02, R2, 9, t4) which elaborates that an object tagged with
EPC_02 has been read 9 times by R2 (at shipping location) at time t4 for shipping. This data
describes the actual path that a tagged product traveled throughout the supply chain from its
start to its end which indicates transition between business phases in the distributed RFID sup-
ply chain. All the events related to a specific tag are stored in a distributed manner in the local
EPCIS before synchronizing at EPCDS centralized management system to form e-pedigree
[23] that can be accessed and shared by the trading partners.
Pharmaceutical industry is one of the early adopters of the passive RFID tags in their supply
chain to control counterfeit medicines in the legal market [1]. However, passive RFID tags are
susceptible to elementary cloning and counterfeiting attacks [1], [32]. Furthermore, since
RFID readers are easily available, tracking the tag bearer is somewhat possible for the adversary
to read the RFID tag and correlate its time and place to learn more about the tag. Once the tag
identification is captured, the adversary can duplicate genuine tags and use the cloned tag for
malicious purposes. As in [17], we assume that an adversary replicates the EPC of a counterfeit
tag only when the genuine tag is manufactured and attached to product. Once the tag identifi-
cation is captured, the adversary can duplicate genuine tags and use the cloned tag for mali-
cious purposes. As RFID tags are prone to cloning, the control and monitoring of counterfeit
medicines in pharmaceutical industry is a critical issue.
B. Related work
With a wide variety of practical application of RFID tags, securing RFID infrastructure has
attracted serious attention recently [33–35]. Although the problem of tag cloning has been iden-
tified as one of serious RFID security issues, it only received little attention in the literature.
Presently, there are two major approaches in handling tag cloning; prevention and detection
[9], [17], [18]. Prevention methods provide security against tag cloning by adopting cryptogra-
phy and encryption technology to the tags. However, none of the approaches yet claim to end
the cloning attack completely. Moreover, this approach cannot be implemented in the low cost
tag that has been mandated for supply chain use due to constraint in the storage and computa-
tional power [14]. Therefore, detection method is the appropriate way to handle clone tag issue
for low cost tags.
Several approaches concerning to clone tag detection and sketch data structure were stud-
ied. As projected in [36], events generated by clone tags are considered appear in the traces of
genuine product and may cause abnormal event which can be detected as infrequent occur-
rence in the modeled supply chain process. In view of this scenario, example of the infrequent
occurrence could be exposed by tag reading frequency of the tagged object in the modeled sup-
ply chain. This study considers an attacker replicated the EPC only when the genuine tag is
ready. Therefore, the tag reading frequency of clone tag is rationally lesser than the genuine tag
since time duration the clone tag exists is shorter than the genuine tag.
Even though imperfect tag reading frequency can lead to missing read or false negative,
many data cleaning systems used temporal smoothing filter approach to handle this lost read-
ings issue [37]. In that approach, a sliding window over the reader’s data stream interpolates
for lost readings from each tag within the time window to provide more opportunities for each
tag to be read within the smoothing window [37]. Furthermore, the experiment results pre-
sented in [17] and [18] revealed that genuine tag is repeatedly read in a high rate. Anyway,
Clone RFID tag detection
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clone tags that appear before the corresponding genuine tags manufactured or after they are
consumed are not considered in this study.
Through an analysis on a number of anti-counterfeiting approaches in both known and
anonymous RFID systems appeared in studies between 2008 and 2016 as in Table 1, the pro-
cess of clone detection for low cost tag is briefly based on appearance of tags having identical
EPC. The tags with identical EPC produced tag collision known as time slot collision in Tree-
based anti-collision protocols and hash collision in Aloha-based anti-collision protocols that
produced the same hash digest value (output of hash function). According to [38], the use of
hash values introduces possibility of tag collision among tags with the same digest. In reality,
any hash function applied to different input can generate the same output due to the inherent
features of the hashing. Therefore, our approach considers this by looking at consistency in
dual hash collisions.
Clone detection through identical EPC not only applicable in known RFID system but also
in anonymous RFID system as studies in [39] and [25]. GREAT [39], BASE [25] and DeClone
[25] are clone tag detection approaches in anonymous RFID system and used slotted Aloha to
find any hash collision that caused possible irreconcilable collision due to identical EPC.
GREAT is an approach that is based on framed slotted Aloha anti-collision and detects the
clone tag probabilistically while DeClone is the improved approach of similar groundwork
with addition on the Breadth First tree traversal (BFS).
Fast clone tag identification protocols for large-scale RFID systems [19] required more
spaces to store the expected and actual reading list while comparison between the lists gives
significant impact on the execution time. GREAT [39] adopts probabilistic arbitration protocol
and therefore only tolerates a few clones. Besides, execution time of GREAT tends to be infi-
nite if used to detect 100% clone tags. In BASE [25], the amount of tag and amount of EPC is
compared for the reason that clone attack makes tag quantity exceed the EPC quantity. How-
ever, this approach is less efficient for large scale system because clone tags might respond at
the very beginning of the protocol execution yet BASE needs to count almost all tags until it
detects the tag quantity exceed the EPC quantity. Table 2 provides the summary of RFID clone
tag detection approaches.
Another anti-counterfeiting approach in anonymous RFID systems, DCTD [22] was devel-
oped based on Tree-based anti-collision protocols. A pseudonym method is chosen to prevent
possible leakage of tag IDs in the detection process, and the Manchester code is adapted to
speed-up finding irreconcilable collisions. DCTD preloaded each tag and backend server with
unique secret pseudonym and updated privately after every successful authentication between
tag and the legal reader. When reader sends a query prefix, the tag responds the query only if
it’s pseudonym contains this prefix. The approaches in [19], [22], [25], [39] reveal that cloning
of the genuine EPC can be triggered by tag collision not only in known RFID systems but also
in anonymous RFID systems. However, the approaches required genuine and clone tags to be
presented at the same time and location.
Studies in [17] and [18] allocated a unique EPC and a secret random number on every tag
as well as study in [22]. A record of tag EPC and its corresponding secret random numbers are
stored and synchronously changed in both the tag and backend database server. Random
number on tag’s memory will be rewrite and updates when reader reads the tag. Clone tag is
detected when reader reads tag with different random number as stored in the backend server.
Study in [9] apply almost similar approach for clone tag detection as in [17] and [18]. In [9],
the reader writes random number to tag as it pass through supply chain and constitute a tail.
The tails of genuine tags and clone ones are inconsistent over time and therefore making the
clone tag be identified by comparing these tails. BASE [25], DeClone [25] and DCTD [22] for
instance aim for anonymous RFID system which EPC is unknown. Eventually these
Clone RFID tag detection
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approaches rely on tag collision due to identical EPC to detect the clone existence. Therefore
this baseline is adapted to our approach which is focus on known RFID system.
Table 1. Parameters for RFID tag clone detection in known and anonymous RFID systems.
Deterministic Identification Methods
(Tag of RFID standard Class-One Generation-Two (ISO 18000-6c)
Papers / Approaches TID Other parameters
1 Synchronized Secrets Approach for RFID-
enabled Anti-Counterfeiting [17]
Yes The same secret random number kx is stored on both the tag’s memory and the backend
database.
On every web service invocation, a new random secret kx+1 is generated and updated in both,
the backend database and the tag’s memory.
2 Securing RFID systems by detecting tag
cloning [18]
Yes The same secret random number kx is stored on both the tag’s memory and the backend
database.
On every web service invocation, a new random secret kx+1 is generated and updated in both,
the backend database and the tag’s memory.
3 Fast cloned-tag identification protocols for
large-scale RFID systems [19]
Yes Establish expected reading list and compare with actual reading list
4 Exposing Clone RFID Tags at the Reader [11] Yes Clone tags are trivially evident on the basis that multiple EPC’s of the same value were
obtained in a single inventory cycle (clones need to appear in the same tag group, and at the
same reader in time)
5 DTD [10], [40] Yes 1st track—Verification information is written on tag as products flow along the supply chain
which forming verification sequences
2nd track—Check on consistency of business transaction performed during the supply chains
The verification sequence together with the sequence formed by business actions performed
during the supply chains yield two tracks which can be assessed to detect the presence of clone
tags
6 TDPS [20] Yes Product e-pedigrees in manufacturing to facilitate RFID-based track-and-trace anti-
counterfeiting.
7 Tailing RFID Tags for Clone Detection [9] Yes RFID readers write random values to tags as they pass through a supply chain, creating in
each tag a tail composed of random values.
The tails of legitimate tags and clone ones diverge over time, making cloning detectable by a
centralized detector even across blind zones.
Anonymous RFID systems
(Tag of RFID standard Class-One Generation-Two (ISO 18000-6c)
Detecting anonymous clones requires solutions that accept tag IDs as “black boxed”
Papers / Approaches TID Other parameters
1 GREAT [39] Irreconcilable
collisions
Using Aloha-based anti-collision protocol to find irreconcilable collisions.
GREAT used slotted Aloha h(f,r,ID) to find possible irreconcilable collisions.
2 BASE [25] Irreconcilable
collisions
ID cardinality and tag cardinality.
BASE used slotted Aloha h(f,r,ID) to find possible irreconcilable collisions.
3 DeClone [25] Irreconcilable
collisions
Uses a hybrid design of slotted Aloha and tree traversal (Breadth First tree traversal-BFS) to
determine collisions.
DeClone used slotted Aloha h(f,r,ID) to find possible irreconcilable collisions.
4 DCTD [22] Irreconcilable
collisions
Using a Tree-based anti-collision algorithm to find irreconcilable collisions by dividing the
tags that answer the query in collision time slots into many different groups until each group
have only one ID.
Tags with the same ID are always divided into the same group, and then gives rise to an
irreconcilable collision.
Adopt the Manchester code to speed up finding out irreconcilable collisions.
Each tag is preloaded with a unique secret pseudonym. After a successful authentication
between a tag and the legal reader, the pseudonym stored both in the backend server and in
the tag should be updated privately.
The reader sends a query prefix at first, and then the tags in the reader’s work range respond
the query only if their own ID contains this prefix.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193951.t001
Clone RFID tag detection
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C. Sketch vector data structure
In line with [41], storing streaming data in memory can be done efficiently using sketch.
According to [42], a sketch is a summary data structure that requires storage which is signifi-
cantly smaller than the input stream length. Sketch based methods liked count-min sketch
[42] is using hashing to map items in the streaming data onto a small-space sketch vector that
can easily be updated and queried. The count-min sketch modeled the data stream as a vector
a(1..K) and use d pairwise independent hash functions {h1..hd}. Pairwise independence is a
method to construct a universal hash family, a technique that ensures lower number of colli-
sions in the hash implementation.
Recently, sketch techniques have been used in frequent item mining [43], [44] and anomaly
detection [45]. According to [46], sketch techniques can be used to perform distributed com-
putation of aggregates without the need to send the actual data values. The tight connection
with both data streaming and distributed computation makes sketching techniques important
from both the theoretical and practical point of view. Approach in [43] used sequential sketch
approach to create hash-compressed representations before mining frequent sequential pat-
terns of uncertain time series data stream.
Table 2. Summary of RFID clone tag detection approaches.
Approaches Weaknesses
1 DTD [10], [40] The rules indicated still rely on a predefined structure of supply
chain (business transaction) and therefore it is not flexible for
dynamically change supply chain as the author claimed.
Great reliance on product movement information from e-pedigree.
2 Fast cloned-tag identification protocols for
large-scale RFID systems [19]
The approach involves establishing expected reading list and
compare with actual reading list, thus it required more spaces to
store the expected and actual reading list while comparison
between the lists gives significant impact on the execution time
especially for large scale systems.
3 GREAT [39] Cannot detect all clone tags completely and the detection
performance is probabilistic because of bounded-ness of the frame
slotted Aloha anti-collision adopted.
Find out irreconcilable collisions in a probabilistic way therefore
tolerate only a few clones.
Execution time of GREAT tends to be infinite if used to detect
100% clone tags.
4 Securing RFID systems by detecting tag
cloning [18]
Used two parameters, similar EPC and secret random number on
every tag to detect clone tag in which unsynchronized secrets are
another proof of a tag cloning attack.
However the presented method still needs to be used together with
a manual inspection to determine which of the objects is clone
under different cases.
5 BASE [25] Tag and EPC quantity is compared because a cloning attack makes
tag quantity exceed EPC quantity. BASE needs to count almost all
tags until it detects the cloning attack.
Thus, it is less efficient for large scale (more than 1000 tags)
because clone tags might respond at the very beginning of the
protocol execution.
6 DeClone [25] Even though it claims that clone tag can be detected when at least
one of the slots allocated get only one EPC hashed into, it still
uncertain to differentiate which of the suspicious tag is clone and
which is genuine.
7 DCTD [22] It still uncertain to differentiate which of the suspicious tag is clone
and which is genuine.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193951.t002
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Approach in this study apply a modified count-min sketch with two independent hash
functions in observing identical EPC in local site and distributed region in supply chain. The
appearance of identical EPC can be endorsed through consistency of dual hash collisions in
the modified count-min sketch vector data structure. We consider the tag reading count and
time are constantly updated in the same sketch of each reader. When certain point of time is
met, record of the tag readings can be removed from the sketch. Clone tags that appear before
the corresponding genuine products or tags are manufactured or after they are consumed are
not considered in this study.
Clone tag detection algorithm
In this section, we described how the proposed approach detects and verifies the presence of a
cloned tag in distributed RFID system with sketch vector. The algorithm is design for con-
trolled environment where there is time boundary for each tag to arrive at each location. This
setting is a norm in manufacturing fields where objects moves by their schedule.
A. The proposed approach
We refer to Fig 3 for the description. We assume that the RFID tag readings are in a form of
data stream [21]. Let S = {sketch1, sketch2,. . ., sketchM} denotes a data stream of tag readings
that is divided into batches of T seconds where M 1. Since the data stream is unbounded
stream, it is divided into batches of T times (example within a number of epochs) (e.g. 2 epochs
 2.5s per epoch = 5s) for processing. Internally, the data stream is a sequence of sketches, one
for each batch interval (e.g. batch data in 5s).
The sketch is a distributed collection of tag readings that is spread out across multiple RFID
readers collaborated between the supply chain partners. Each sketch contains the tag reading
records received during the batch interval. Data contained in the sketches are partitioned into
a set of modified Count-Min (CM) sketches. Let CM = {CM1, CM2,. . ., CMN} denotes a set of
modified CM sketches where N> 1 Data in the sketches are partitioned and cached in mem-
ory of central server based on RFID readers involved (the message values are parsing into
Reader objects). Let R = {R1, R2,. . ., RN} denotes the set of RFID readers involved in the supply
chain. Assume there is just one base stream containing tag reading information with schema:
Fig 3. Mapping of base stream into modified count-min sketch.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193951.g003
Clone RFID tag detection
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ReadingInfoðtagID; reader; readcount; timeÞ
Attribute tagID identifies the tag EPC, reader denotes the reader that read the tag (also rep-
resent location where the tag is read), readcount denotes the number of read occurrence and
time denotes the tag reading time. Following is example of query to map data contained in the
sketches into modified CM sketch of specific reader:
FOR CMN
SELECT 
FROM S
WHERE sketch.reader = = N
Let h1 and h2 represent the hash function for the first row and the second row of each CM.
Let Rc = {Rc1, Rc2} R, where Rc1 denotes a set of readers that are involved in hash collision
using hash function h1 and Rc2 denotes a set of readers that are involved in hash collision using
hash function h2 The following are examples of query to find Rc1 and Rc2 (TRUE if hash colli-
sion occur):
SELECT Rc1
FROM R
WHERE h1 (R1.tagID,. . .,RN.tagID) = TRUE
SELECT Rc2
FROM R
WHERE h2(R1.tagID,. . .,RN.tagID) = TRUE
Let Rf = {Rf1,. . .,Rfx}Rc denotes set of readers where X>1 that ultimately having hash colli-
sion at both hash functions h1 and h2 if and any if the tagID is equal. Let EqualTagID represent
function to check if the tagID is identical (TRUE if tagID is identical). Following is example of
query to find Rf:
SELECT Rf
FROM Rc1, Rc2
WHERE EqualTagID(Rc1.tagID, Rc2.tagID) = TRUE
For an identical tagID, Rf.readcount updated in the CMs are compared. We consider the
genuine tag is the one that having greater readcount, otherwise the tag is clone. To demonstrate
the proposed approach, we have already implemented it in a specific case study as demon-
strated in the following section.
B. RFID data stream
Readers interrogate adjacent tags by sending out radio frequency (RF) signal. RFID tags in the
area respond to these signals with their unique EPC. Technically a tag can be read one at a
time in very rapid succession. The process happens very quickly such that it seems like the
reader is interrogating many tags at once. However, for a very dense tag population, the tags
would need to be in the read field for few seconds [47]. According to [48], when a reader sends
a signal to determine all tags in its reading vicinity, it is known as single interrogation cycle.
The results from a number of interrogation cycles are grouped into an epoch that is specified
as a unit of time which typically ranges between 0.2–0.25 seconds. Within this time, the reader
keeps track of all the tags it has identified, as well as additional information such as the number
of interrogation responses for each tag and the time at which the tag was last read. The infor-
mation is stored internally in a tag list which is periodically transferred to the reader’s client
[48]. The approach in this study receives the reading list by all the connected readers periodi-
cally for mapping, updating and cloning checks.
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In line with [48], this study mapped RFID readings statistically. The observed readings can
be viewed as a random sample of tags population in the physical world. The number of tag
reading frequency in an epoch is a random variable that follows Binomial distribution as work
in [48]. The observed reading frequency for such tag during an epoch is sampled in conjunc-
tion with the known number of interrogation cycles per epoch. As depicted in Table 3, by
assuming a reader configured with a total number of 10 interrogation cycles per epoch and the
overall tag reading frequency in the major detection region is around 80%, the reading fre-
quency differ across tags and can vary over times as the observed tags move within the reader’s
detection range. The reading frequencies stored in the tag lists submitted by the readers are
employed as input to the proposed approach. The updated tag reading frequency is preserved
as second parameter for clone check.
C. Mapping tag reading to modified count-min sketch
According to [49], sketch property are perfectly suitable for both data streaming and distrib-
uted computation, since they can be updated on pieces. With some modifications, this study
implemented the count-min (CM) sketch data structure introduced by [42]. The CM sketch
modeled the data stream as a vector a(1..K) and use d pairwise independent hash functions
{h1..hd}. Pairwise independence is sometimes called as strong universality. Each of the hash
function hashes each of the input (EPC) into uniformly random integer in the range (1..K)
where K is the quantity of home buckets. The data structure itself consists of two dimensional
array with size (space used) Kh cells with length of K and width of h. Each hash function
matches to one 1-dimensional array with K cells.
When an update (it,ct) comes from the stream, hash functions are used to determine the
counter position for updating the sketch by hashing the it and add the ct to the corresponding
cell in each row. Linked nodes and home buckets are applied in the original count-min sketch
to reduce a one-to-one correspondence between record addresses and possible tags read. Fur-
thermore, this technique is to minimize slot collision issue which will strictly eliminate inser-
tion of new tag reads. Sketch vector applied in this study includes two dimensional array
denoted by CM[d,K]. d is the number of hash functions h(d) and K is the quantity of home
bucket which is also the maximum hash value range (uniformly random). For example, let hj
be the j-th hash function in h(d):CM[0,. . .,k] that hash the EPC for record address and store its
EPC (tagID), location (reader), reading count (readcount) and reading time (time) to the j-th
row at the hj(EPC) column. Initial value for each element in the CM[d,k] is set to 0. For
Table 3. Tag reading data.
Reader 1 Reader 2 Reader 3
EPC Read Count Time EPC Read Count Time EPC Read Count Time
1 10 t1 7 10 t2 6 7 t3
2 7 t1 8 10 t2 12 9 t1
3 9 t1 5 2 t4 17 8 t2
4 10 t1 6 1 t4 18 10 t1
2 7 t2 2 3 t4 5 8 t2
6 8 t2
2 7 t3
7 2 t3
8 3 t3
5 9 t3
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193951.t003
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repeated tag read, the attributes update for example reading count is added to CM[j,hj(EPC)]
as in Eq 1.
CM½j; hjðEPCÞ ¼ CM½j; hjðEPCÞ þ readcount ð1Þ
The following illustration Fig 4 demonstrated the proposed approach based on sample data
of tag reading in Table 3. Fig 4 illustrates the CM sketch visualization of mapping and update
reading for three readers. At initial point, all counters are set to 0. Each EPC is mapped to one
slot in each row of the particular CM sketch. For every slot address resulted from both hash
functions used, a bucket is created that will contain an item or linked items in the case of colli-
sion at the same slot.
Table 4 shows the content of each CM sketch vector used for every reader in Fig 4. The
table prints out content of all non-empty buckets and its item or corresponding linked items.
D. Managing counterfeit hash algorithm
We now explain the proposed clone tag detection algorithm which we refer to as the Managing
Counterfeit Hash (MCH). The proposed approach considers two different but interrelated
Fig 4. CM sketch visualization of initial, map and update reading for three readers.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193951.g004
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steps for evaluating the presence of clone tags: (i) consistency of dual hash collision at different
CM sketch vectors (different readers) and (ii) the tag reading frequency.
A cloned tag has a duplicate copy of EPC of a genuine tag. When a reader reads the tags, it
cannot differentiate between the two tags. However, when hashing the same EPC using the
same hash function, hash collisions occur because the hashing process produced the same
hash digest value. Hash collision produced from the hash function represents slot collision in
the CM sketch vectors. Our approach relies on consistency of hash collision by two hash func-
tions in the different CM sketch vectors to reveal the presence of clones. As noted earlier, an
adversary creates cloned tags after the genuine tag is ready, the tag reading frequency of the
cloned tag is reasonably lesser than the genuine tag. Thus, if a hash collision occurs and there
exists identical EPC at both CM sketch vectors, constantly updated reading frequency may
determine precisely at which reader the clone tag exists.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code of the proposed clone tag detection algorithm in dis-
tributed RFID system. The core input to MCH is sequence of sketches that consist tag reading
information with attributes tagID,reader,readcount and time. At lines 1–3, MCH will first
check the time to remove all the readings. If the time is met, all the counters will be reset to
zero. Next, at line 5, reading from each reader is sent in form of base data stream to the central
coordinator which will execute this approach. For mapping and update at line 5–20, each
incoming reading from sketches will be mapped to CMN if the reader is N. In the specific CM
sketch, the tagID will be hashed using two hash functions and the output is considered as the
counter position into the sketch vector (line 8–9). At line 10–13, the algorithm first checks to
see if counter position for the hash digest value is filled at particular sketch vector. If null,
bucket is created and the read tag item is added to the bucket. If not null and if the item count
not exceeds bucket size, the read tag item is added to the bucket tail. If item count exceeds the
bucket size, the bucket is considered overflow. For clone detection at line 21–32, if equal tagID
traced in the similar bucket position in at least two readers at once, readcount of the tagID is
compared (line 27). tagID that has less readcount is considered as clone tag. Therefore, this can
verify at which reader the clone tag exists precisely.
Algorithm 1: MCH
Input: sketch
BEGIN
1. IF (Time = True) THEN //empty the space
Table 4. Print vector content.
Reader 1 Reader 2 Reader 3
2! 6! 8!
1! 6! 2! 8! 6!
4! 7! 17! 18!
7! 5! 12! 5!
3! 6! 6! 17!
5! 7! 12! 18! 5!
6! 5!
1! 7! 2! 8!
4!
5!
2! 8!
3!
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193951.t004
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2. CMN={0}
3. ENDIF
4. //map and update
5. WHILE reading from sketch
6. //map to CMN IF sketch.reader=N
7. For each CMN do:
8. FOR (i = 1 TO d) //insert data at hi
9. positioni←hj(tagID)
10. IF (CMN[hj, positioni]=NULL) THEN
11. //create bucket and add item
12. ELSE IF (CMN[hj, positioni]≠NULL) THEN
13. //add linked item
14. END IF
15. IF (sketch.tagID=CMN.tagID) THEN
16. //update readcount and time
17. ELSE //add item to the bucket tail
18. END IF
19. END FOR
20. END WHILE
21. // clone detection
22. Find Rc1 and Rc2 from R
23. Find set of Rf from Rc1 and Rc2
24. IF(Rc1.tagID=Rc2.tagID) THEN
25. RETURN Rf
26. For each Rf do:
27. IF (Rf.readcount is greater) THEN
28. // tag at Rf is genuine
29. ELSE // trigger alarm to indicate clone tag
detected at Rf
30. ELSE
31. // genuine tag
32. END IF
END MCH
Algorithm 1: MCH
Referring to the example illustrated in the previous section, we executed experiment that
identifies clone tag at three different readers by assuming the readers are distributed at differ-
ent places. We apply principle that genuine tag is read in a high rate. Clone tag detection can
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be identified on at least two readers at once in order to accurately trigger existing of clone and
at which reader. Furthermore, the similar clone EPC may not exist at all readers. If considering
all readers in Rf that having identical EPC simultaneously, the genuine tag is considered having
higher reading frequency.
Table 5 shows the results example of our clone detection approach. The results point out
that clone is correctly measure if it is traced twice (1st and 2nd trace) on the same tag and both
reporting the clone tag exist at similar reader (e.g. 1st trace at reader 2 (r2) and 2nd trace also at
reader 2 (r2)). The 1st and 2nd trace represents that the similar EPC triggered slot collision at
both hash functions. Table 6 illustrates the position of tag reading in particular CM sketch with
updated reading rate.
Performance evaluation
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of the proposed algorithm. The perfor-
mance of the proposed approach is compared against BASE [25] and DeClone [25].
A. Experimental setup
We use simulation to analyze the performance of the proposed clone detection and determina-
tion approach. In the experiment, the data has been generated using Binomial distribution to
illustrate the tag read count in an epoch as used in [48]. The performance of the proposed
approach is compared against BASE [25] and DeClone [25] in terms of execution time and
detection accuracy. The clone detection accuracy is measured via the ratio of collisions and
Table 5. Clone check results at three readers.
Results of Clone Check between R1 and R2
2! 1st trace of clone at r2
2! 2nd trace of clone at r2
5! 1st trace of clone at r2
5! 2nd trace of clone at r2
6! 1st trace of clone at r2
6! 2nd trace of clone at r2
7! 1st trace of clone at r1
7! 2nd trace of clone at r1
8! 1st trace of clone at r1
8! 2nd trace of clone at r1
Results of Clone Check between R1 and R3
5! 1st trace of clone at r3
5! 2nd trace of clone at r3
6! 1st trace of clone at r3
6! 2nd trace of clone at r3
Results of Clone Check between R2 and R3
5! 1st trace of clone at r2
5! 2nd trace of clone at r2
6! 1st trace of clone at r2
6! 2nd trace of clone at r2
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193951.t005
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total readings as in following Eqs 2 and 3:
Error ratio ¼
Collisions
Total readings
 100 ð2Þ
Clone accuracy ¼ 100   Error ratio ð3Þ
In this study, the collisions represent slot collisions that used to indicate probable clone due
to similar hash digest value. Eq 4 is used to measure clone detection accuracy (CDA) for MCH.
CDA ¼
Number of clones
Number of collided slots
 100 ð4Þ
Before executing the comparison, empirical work is done to the proposed approach for
determining ideal bucket size in accordance to the appropriate packing density. Note that a
slight modification is made to DeClone and BASE algorithms, however still based towards
hash collision in Aloha-based approach due to existence of similar EPC. The modification is
around simulation of the approaches in distributed environment as suggested.
B. Ideal bucket size in accordance to packing density
As a rule of thumb, it is often found that collisions become unacceptably frequent if packing
density exceeds 70% [50]. In other words, packing density is better to be lower than 70%. In
the experiment, execution time of MCH is measured with a few sets of bucket size (bs) in 60%
packing density. The following packing density Eq 5 as in [50] is used in this study to measure
quantity of home bucket required for 60% packing density.
PD ¼
M
bs  K
ðwhich must be  1Þ ð5Þ
Assume that there are K home buckets, each has a capacity of bs records and M records are
put into the file. Based on Eq 5, Table 7 shows the measurement of home bucket quantity for
M records. Since we measure up to 10,000 numbers of readings for 60% packing density, 1667
home buckets were applied in each CM sketch. However, for any selected bs in conjunction
with packing density (PD), there will be expected file overflow which is not discuss in this
study.
Table 6. Tag reading in particular CM sketch with updated reading rate.
Reader 1 Reader 2 Reader 3
r1[0][222]! 8(read: 3)
r1[0][598]! 5(read: 9)
r1[0][805]! 2(read: 21)
r1[0][885]! 4(read: 10)
r1[0][968]! 3(read: 9)
r1[0][1061]! 6(read: 8)
r1[0][1227]! 7(read: 2)
r1[0][1463]! 1(read: 10)
r2[0][222]! 8(read: 10)
r2[0][598]! 5(read: 2)
r2[0][805]! 2(read: 3)
r2[0][1061]! 6(read: 1)
r2[0][1227]! 7(read: 10)
r3[0][598]! 5(read: 8)
r3[0][920]! 18(read: 10)
r3[0][1061]! 6(read: 7)
r3[0][1277]! 17(read: 8)
r3[0][1637]! 12(read: 9)
r1[1][48]! 5(read: 9)
r1[1][261]! 4(read: 10)
r1[1][615]! 3(read: 9)
r1[1][794]! 8(read: 3)
r1[1][828]! 2(read: 21)
r1[1][1148]! 7(read: 2)
r1[1][1182]! 1(read: 10)
r1[1][1361]! 6(read: 8)
r2[1][48]! 5(read: 2)
r2[1][794]! 8(read: 10)
r2[1][828]! 2(read: 3)
r2[1][1148]! 7(read: 10)
r2[1][1361]! 6(read: 1)
r3[1][48]! 5(read: 8)
r3[1][893]! 17(read: 8)
r3[1][1179]! 18(read: 10)
r3[1][1213]! 12(read: 9)
r3[1][1361]! 6(read: 7)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193951.t006
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C. Comparative analysis of execution time
Extensive experiment is performed to find out bs that will return faster execution time. Fig 5
below shows the execution time of MCH using different number of bucket size bs = 10, bs = 20,
bs = 30, bs = 40 and bs = 50. The number of readings varied from 1,000 to 10,000 with increment
of 1,000 for each sample. For all bs values, the result shows bs = 10 produced faster execution
time with increment in the number of readings. Therefore, this measurement is used as the
baseline in the next experiments to get the best results.
Fig 6 shows the execution time of the three approaches for the tag reading in the range of
1,000 to 10,000 readings. On average, all the approaches: MCH, BASE and DeClone took linear
execution time with respect to the system scale. BASE and DeClone took longer time to detect
the clone tag as compared to MCH. DeClone takes longer execution time because it has to per-
form the breadth first traversal for every single collision occurred before determining possibil-
ity of clone. Therefore, it involves a great amount of execution time for detecting clone tag.
Table 7. Home bucket quantity for bucket size = 10.
Bucket Size, bs = 10
Number of records, M % Packing Density
50 55 60 65 70
Home Bucket Quantity, K
1,000 200 182 167 154 143
2,000 400 364 333 308 286
3,000 600 545 500 462 429
4,000 800 727 667 615 571
5,000 1000 909 833 769 714
6,000 1200 1091 1000 923 857
7,000 1400 1273 1167 1077 1000
8,000 1600 1455 1333 1231 1143
9,000 1800 1636 1500 1385 1286
10,000 2000 1818 1667 1538 1429
: : : : : :
20,000 4000 3636 3333 3077 2857
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193951.t007
Fig 5. Execution time of MCH with 60% packing density and bucket sizes bs = 10, bs = 20, bs = 30, bs = 40 and
bs = 50.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193951.g005
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D. Clone detection accuracy
In this section, we study the clone detection accuracy of the BASE, DeClone and MCH under
varying clone ratio.
Fig 7 illustrates the performance of the BASE and DeClone under varying clone ratio in
10,000 readings. The number of clone EPCs varied from 1 to 200 which make up 2% of the
readings. Fig 7 shows that as the number of cloned EPCs increases, the BASE algorithm tends to
be more accurate in detecting clone tags than the DeClone approach. However, BASE is not
able to find which EPCs are the clones since it just compare the sum of the tags in the system
against the total EPC (clone attack makes the tag quantity to exceed the actual EPC quantity).
Since the fluctuations rates are too small between the different numbers of clone EPCs, the
changes in graph is not really obvious.
Fig 8 shows that MCH obtains higher accuracy for detecting the clone tag as compared to
DeClone and BASE. Furthermore, MCH can precisely determine at which reader the clone tag
exists (as discussed in example case study in section Clone Tag Detection Algorithm) under
varying clone ratio in 10,000 readings. MCH outperforms the DeClone and BASE approaches
in RFID tag clone detection accuracy as much as 99% in average while DeClone 64% and
BASE 77%. Overall, detection accuracy of all approaches observed including MCH is getting
reduced when number of clone increases. This is due to upturn of slots collision that indicate
probable clone when the clone number growths. The slots collision is not yet determine the
Fig 6. Comparison of execution times for detecting clone tag.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193951.g006
Fig 7. Comparison of clone detection accuracy between DeClone and BASE in varying number of clone IDs.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193951.g007
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clone really exist because the hash function used can also produce slots collision when hashing
different EPCs.
Conclusion and future directions
In this paper, the problem of RFID clone tag detection has been studied and a new approach
based on modified count-min sketch vector is proposed. Performance of the proposed approach
is compared with the other related existing approaches. The results illustrate that the proposed
approach performs faster than the baseline approaches in the experiments efficiency and better
accuracy under varying clone ratio. The implementation of dual verification strategy (consistent
hash collision and tag reading frequency) in the proposed approach produces as much as 99% in
RFID tag clone detection accuracy than the other baseline approaches. For future work, this
study plans to apply dynamic hashing together with the count-min sketch vector. This will help
to accommodate the growth and shrinking of the file size over time. Even adding up in complex-
ity, dynamic hashing advantages in minimizing space overhead since no slot need to be reserved
for future use as implemented in static hashing. The proposed approach in this study is using 2D
dynamic array and bucket with d hash functions. If bucket size exceeds the limit, another strategy
will need to be used. Hashing with chaining is applied in the proposed approach and its theoreti-
cal advantage is it does not limit the bucket size. For improvement, the approach can exclude
measurement on the bucket size to overcome limitation on bucket size. Without a pre-defined
number of buckets not to exceed, the bucket will not overflow. A short linear search of the linked
list is still needed, but if the hash function uniformly distributes the items, the list should not be
very long. Presently, the algorithm is designed for controlled environment where there is time
boundary for each tag to arrive at each location. For future improvement, the approach would
consider an open environment for wider deployment.
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